MORALITY AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS

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The premise of this paper is that morality has a significant effect on voting, where morality is defined by the source of its returns: what others think about one's trustworthiness or its internalization conscience. We will show that morality leads people to advocate more interferences with the market than if simple self-interest dominated their decisions.

Many aspects of voting are inconsistent with simple self-interest, where voters are only concerned with the consequences of the policies on which they vote. But self-interest models have been virtually the only fruitful models in the social sciences. Hence, we use an expanded self-interest model where we focus on the returns to trustworthiness in addition to the miniscule returns to policy consequences.

Since this thesis is somewhat different than the ideas dominating the public choice literature, we have organized this paper in a somewhat different way. Our first task is to convince the reader immersed in the standard approach that it might be worthwhile to pay attention. To do this we show that there is an important class of behaviors that cannot be explained by the standard simple self-interest models, but that has the properties assumed in our model. These behaviors include the phenomena of non-use value in particular and what we call

political charity in general. We, then, look at what is known about moral behavior focusing on the most analyzed case: private charity, and see how that knowledge can be applied to political behavior. We then use that knowledge to generate implications about political behavior and test the model. Finally, we discuss policy implications and our conclusions.

1. The Phenomenon of Non-Use Value

There is strong evidence that some kinds of verbal behavior can neither be explained by the standard narrow self-interest model nor by Nelsons (1994) group interest model. Consider the literature on non-use evaluation by environmental economics: where people are asked how much they are willing to pay as their share of the costs to preserve some feature of the environment that they and their heirs will never use nor see. (The equivalent voting format is at what per family costs would they be indifferent between voting for preserving an amenity plus its costs or against it.) That literature is filled with controversy about whether such non-use values are valid parts of the social benefits of preserving environmental resources. But most agree that the answers cannot be explained by narrow self-interest.[1]

Economists, however, are justifiably skeptical about the relationship of verbal to actual behavior. The returns and costs of the hypothetical vote might be sufficiently different from those of the actual vote to overcome the costs of dissembling. This issue arises frequently in the polling literature. There is consensus that the peculiar variable in hypothetical voting is what the interviewer thinks about me or social acceptability. But the theory developed in Nelson (1994) would predict that social acceptability would produce positive non-use values in actual voting if

it produces positive non-use values in hypothetical voting. What others think is important in actual as well as hypothetical voting.[2]

The assessment of positive non-use values to environmental amenities has another obvious property: asymmetry. There are both external benefits and costs in saving an amenity at public cost. The external benefits are others use value of the amenity. The external costs are the costs or taxes that others would incur. If respondents to a questionnaire were simply using a cost-benefit assessment of the amenity and being altruistic, those external costs would be considered as well as the external benefits (Milgrom, 1993). But if the expression of non-use value is not simply an altruistic attempt to take into account net gains of others, then the calculated non-use values may not account for the external costs that others would pay. There is some indirect evidence compatible with the exclusion of external cost in the assessment. Often the non-use value assessed by non-users is higher than the individual use value claimed by users. This means that there is an existence value claimed beyond any use value to users. This is planet love that goes beyond any altruism.[3] At the very least, then, there seems to be an asymmetry between: (1) a concern for others who would be deprived of some benefit because of market processes or individual behavior in non-market areas whether direct or indirect and (2) a concern for others who have to pay for interferences with individual behavior.

2. Moral Behavior, Charity and Political Charity in General

Environmentalism is not the only example of voting asymmetries. All are manifestations of political charity -- voting and political advocacy to signal goodness. To understand how it works it is first necessary to understand how standard charity operates. Virtually all charities are

the purchases of group benefits at the expense of private costs. The standard explanations for this behavior are (1) altruism, and (2) warm glow," some unspecified private return to charity. It has generally been recognized that because of the free-rider problem altruism by itself cannot explain charity (Sugden, 1982).

The trouble with warm glow is that it is so general as to be devoid of many empirical implications. In particular, it does not specify the activities that generate warm glow. Does it make any sense for the warm glow associated with charity to also operate in the voting arena? If it does, is warm glow asymmetric? Does one get warm glow from voting one way but not from voting another way? Answers require some notion of how warm glow operates. We use as our theory that developed and tested in Nelson (1998): the private returns to charity are some combination of returns to signaling to others that you are trustworthy and returns to "clear conscience": a self-image created by what others would think if they knew your behavior.[4] As shown in Nelson (1998), such behavior acts as a signal because those who get the greatest returns from reciprocity are both the most reliable reciprocity partners and have the greatest incentive to signal that they get the greatest returns.

A. Political Charity and Political Positions

Charity signals that one is trustworthy through sacrifices that less trustworthy people would not make. What is the comparable sacrifice for political positions? Because one's vote has so little impact on the outcome of an election, there would be no costs to a political position far different from one's income-maximizing position. However, ones vote, or more particularly ones verbal behavior associated with ones vote, can have an impact on ones set of friends. One

could signal goodness by adopting a position different than that of ones friends at the cost of possibly losing some friends.

Such a signal requires others to know something about ones desired set of friends. But, indeed, they do. They know that a person toward the center of the income distribution is unlikely to advocate greater welfare expenditures to curry favor with the poor, and therefore such actions are likely to signal goodness. They are less sure, however, that any person opposes greater welfare expenditures to signal goodness and not to curry favors from richer people, who have more favors to bestow.[5] This implies that it is easier to signal goodness by adopting pro-poor positions in contrast to pro-rich positions. It is not clear what is the net effect of groveling vs. being good on political position relative to income, but one can predict that those who have the greatest incentive to signal goodness by political positions will be relatively pro-poor.[6] One signals goodness by advocating externality corrections that involve redistribution toward the poor.

Because both goodness and desired associates are signaled by political positions, the former signal depends very much on what others know about the latter prior to the signal. Suppose others know ones desired associates perfectly. Then, the same pro-poor position would imply both a greater cost and greater return in signaling goodness from a person with pro-rich associates than a person with pro-poor associates. Unless one knew the distribution of how much of the signal people wished to buy, one could not predict whether the former or the latter would be more likely to adopt the pro-poor position. If, however, others have only a very rough prior knowledge of desired associates, then a person with pro-rich associates has higher costs relative

to returns from adopting a pro-poor position than does a person with pro-poor associates. In general the greater the costs of signaling goodness, then the less the signal will be used and we predict that those with higher incomes will signal their goodness less by advocating pro-poor positions and more by other methods.

B. Political Charity and Loudness

Besides political positions there is another dimension to political charity: loudness - using up time and money advocating a cause. Political advocacy is quite similar to standard charity. Just like standard charity the sacrifice weeds out those who have less interest in signaling trustworthy behavior and the sacrifice is focused on causes that are good from the perspective of the people one wishes to signal. It differs somewhat from charity because signaling goodness is not the only motivation for advocacy. One can also be loud to signal strong group identification when the group is particularly interested in an issue.

But the most serious empirical problem with loudness lies in its similarity to standard charity. There is a positive income elasticity of demand for charity and, one suspects, loudness as well. On that account the pro-rich are likely to make greater political contributions than the pro-poor. But much of political activism is time intensive. The costs to the rich of such activity go up as well as the return so it is not clear that the level of loudness favors pro-rich or pro-poor outcomes. In the empirical section that follows the manifestation of loudness examined is occupational choice: choosing occupations that give platforms to espouse political positions. Because of compensating differentials, the money income of these occupational groups will be lower than it would be otherwise. Therefore, one expects that income to be lower than groups

with the same amount of education and the same broad occupational classification. All these variables are held constant in our regressions. If we find these groups to be significantly pro-poor, it would be some indication that loudness also works in favor of pro-poor policies. Whatever problems raised in general by this process, will not apply to our specific analysis.

C. Political Charity and Issue Emergence

There is another source of asymmetry in political charity: any difference between what is socially acceptable and government policy in the initial state: when the issue first emerges as an important political question. The most obvious reason why such a difference can occur is the greater political effectiveness of interest groups defending the status quo than the power of those advocating change. (The former know who will be the losers from the change, while it is less clear who will be the big winners from the change). For example, one would expect that in the initial state as air pollution emerges as a serious political issue the government would under-correct for air pollution even when a majority of people recognize the existence of this external cost. The political power of special interests like the electric utilities would outweigh the power of special interests like the not yet developed scrubber industry. In this initial state most good people would advocate air pollution correcting policies instead of less; while, more special interest statements would be generated by those opposed to such externality correcting policy. In this initial state one signals more goodness by advocating more air pollution controls than advocating less.

Now, suppose the government adopts the right amount of pollution controls. One would still signal goodness by being in favor of more pollution controls. People have the belief that

this is such a signal, and, in this case, that belief would be self-confirming. Those who are more trustworthy, have a greater incentive to signal that they are trustworthy (Nelson, 1998). Hence, there will be a higher ratio of the trustworthy among advocates of more pollution controls.

Now, suppose the government over-corrects. The knowledgeable will begin to advocate less pollution controls,[7] but for a long time it will still pay to signal goodness by advocating greater pollution controls. Suppose at that level of government expenditures some know that the expenditures are excessive, but everybody uses the positions of others in the previous period as their estimate of what is socially acceptable. Since social acceptability is the main return from advocacy, it would pay the individual to go with the flow," to still advocate more pollution controls if that were the position of others, though his advocacy will be reduced by a minuscule amount by his new information. Nelson (1994) shows that long lags in political positions can result and that voting behavior in the 1980's is more closely related to group income at the turn of the century than contemporaneous group income. In general, long lags are characteristic of any activity in which social approval is a dominating source of returns. In sharp contrast market behavior has much shorter lags because the dominating source of returns is individual income.

D. The Existence of Asymmetry

Goodness is not dominantly one-sided for all issues. Signaling goodness by defending the poor extends to so signaling by defending any poor group such as blacks or women. But defending the latter group can conflict with family values especially over the issue of abortion. The defense of the latter can also signal goodness. There should be a positive relationship between those who practice sexual morality as traditionally defined and those who advocate

public policies that promote such morality. There are potential costs to those who would advocate morality publicly while being amoral privately: the costs of hypocrisy discovered. One expects trustworthiness in sexual relations to be positively related to trustworthiness in general. (There is a concern with maintaining past relationships in both cases).

Defense expenditures is another issue over which there are conflicted signals. Patriotism signals national identification with expected greater trustworthiness vis a vis members of the majority group. On the other hand, one can signal compassion for the lives endangered by military activity by opposing increased defense expenditures.

3. A Study of Voter Behavior

We can test some of the hypotheses previously developed by running regressions on answers to public policy questions against characteristics of respondents and their families given by data from General Social Surveys 1972-1996 (NORC, 1998). Currently, the preferred procedure in running such regressions is parsimony, but those working with the simple self-interest model usually cannot resist the inclusion of at least a few variables that they cannot justify on theoretical grounds such as race, region, or city size. We include a large number of variables. That inclusion is justified by the theory we are testing: that concern with others opinions of oneself is crucial in the determination of voter behavior. There are two main manifestations of that concern: (1) voting like your friends vote, (2) voting to be good. Here we will concentrate primarily on the latter, since the former is more thoroughly examined in Nelson [1994]. There, for example, we see the rationale behind the inclusion of the ethnic variables.

A. The Issues

Our approach is to examine 17 different issues opinions about which will be potentially affected by political charity. We use the commonly accepted liberal vs. conservative characterization of views about these issues. On all these issues one can display one's goodness by being liberal. On a few being conservative also offers goodness displaying opportunities. What is crucial, though, is that those groups which have an incentive to be good liberals on one issue will have an incentive to be good liberals on the other issues.

All but one of the surveyed issues dividing liberals and conservatives have a redistributive component. As we have seen, support of the poor is one way to be good. The most obvious of such issues are welfare and aid to the poor.[8] Similarly, more expenditures for blacks on average are redistributive toward the poor. Given the distribution of the costs of those programs, those that are not explicitly pro-poor can be redistributive. Per capita taxes for the rich are greater than for the poor, as are their per capita share of business taxes and the costs of regulation. Therefore government programs for health, education, mass transit, and the environment also can be so characterized. Social security is also on net redistributive toward the poor, at least in terms of permanent income.

There can be cases where the share of returns to government programs of higher-income groups can be greater than their share of the costs. Such programs may include defense and police. In the latter half of the twentieth century the Communist Soviet Union was the main external enemy. The costs to the rich of its success would have been substantially greater than the costs to the poor. An important function of the police is the protection of property and the

rich own more than do the poor. The rich are also less likely to be criminals or charged with crimes, so the interests of this latter group will weigh less in their decisions. There is also a positive income elasticity of demand for automobile travel and for the goods transported by trucks. It is not clear whether this more or less counter-balances the share of taxes paid by higher income groups to finance road construction. The primary liberal objection to more roads is a by-product of their pro-environmental position. Roads create more urban sprawl, destroy the aesthetics of the land, and contribute to air pollution. Moreover, if all taxes are fungible, the main form of redistribution that occurs with roads is from urban to rural areas. The liberal base in urban areas will also tend to make them anti-road and so we interpret being in favor of more spending on roads as a conservative position.

The one policy issue surveyed by NORC dividing liberals and conservatives that is not based on redistribution is the abortion question. Do-gooders may be associated with feminist issues in part because women earn less than men. But more importantly, liberal do-gooders tend to be less religious and less concerned with family values than others, as we show later. Religion and family values are the main under-pinnings of the anti-abortion movement.

Because we will be looking at so many regressions,[9] 19 in all, there is a problem with tests of significance. It would be quite likely that a variable will be significant at the 5% level in at least one case just by chance. However, the likelihood that a variable will be significant at the 5% level in at least three cases is .067, and the likelihood of this occurrence in at least four cases is .014. In consequence, we will be slightly overstating the significance of the variable when we state that three significant regression coefficients for the variable implies significance and

slightly understating when we state that it is insignificant unless there are four or more such occurrences.

One problem faced in these regressions is what to do about the variables in a regression that are not significant but for which there is a prior case for inclusion. We took two alternative approaches. (1) Including all variables in any given regression that are significant in at least one of the regressions. (2) Including in any regression only significant variables (at the 10% level) in that regression. While the detailed results differ somewhat, the over-all pattern of the results remains the same. (Because of space limitations only the results for (1) are reported here). To maintain comparability among our regressions, we have used ordinary least squares throughout, though probit or multinomial logit would be more appropriate for some of the regressions. Monte Carlo experiments have shown that usually there are not big differences in the results using these alternative techniques especially where sample sizes are very large like ours. Most of the problems with regressions cannot be solved by different techniques. Confidence can be generated only by consistent results over different kinds of data. That is why we have looked at so many issues as reported in Table 1.

B. Self-Interest Variables

When economists explore political behavior, they focus exclusively on narrow self-interest: How one would vote if solely concerned with the consequences of the policies voted for. This approach is unsatisfactory theoretically because of the free-rider problem. Ones vote has virtually no impact on policy consequences because ones vote is virtually irrelevant in determining outcomes. Still, narrow self-interest variables do have an impact empirically. Even

if moral behavior is operative, the narrow self-interest of the associates whom one is trying to please produces an observed narrow self-interest effect.

The most important narrow self-interest variables we use is income and its square. With the exception of abortion, all of the issues have a redistributive component. In 11 out of the 19 cases the slope of log income at its mean is significant in the conservative direction: only in one case are they more liberal: they are more pro-abortion. In this case the liberal cause does not involve greater government expenditures.

Another self-interest variable is whether a person is self-employed or not. While one expects business and regulatory costs ultimately to be shifted to either consumers or owners of capital, there will be some short-run costs born by current owners of businesses. Furthermore, one expects the self-employed to be more knowledgeable about this tax burden and many self-employed to be imperfectly aware of tax shifting. So one would expect the self-employed to be opposed to increased government expenditures. This is the case. There are twelve cases in which the self-employed are significantly conservative. There are only two cases where they adopt significantly more liberal positions, in each case being opposed to greater government expenditures, first on roads and, then, on the police.

Consider broad occupations as given by the 1968 Standard International Codes. One expects higher income occupations to behave similarly to high-income families, even controlling for family income. One would expect members of these occupations to associate more with high-income families, even holding constant their own income. Furthermore, holding constant occupational income, one expects members of white-collar occupations to do more associating

with high-income families. In consequence, one expects such occupations to ape the behavior of high-income groups.

Using Production and Related Workers as the control group, we looked at the behavior of dummy variables for professionals, managers, clerical workers, sales workers, service workers and agricultural workers, including their spouses. All but service workers behave more conservatively than the control group in that each contains at least five significantly conservative coefficients.

Race is another self-interest variable. Obviously, Afro-Americans should be in favor of greater expenditures for Afro-Americans. Also party and conservative-liberal identification and votes for President have a direct self-interest component for blacks because of party differences over affirmative action. There are other issues that are not explicitly about race, but because of imitation blacks should vote the same way low-income groups vote, even though family income is one of the control variables. Blacks are significantly more liberal on fifteen issues and are significantly more conservative on one issue: crime.[10]

C. Substitution: Religion

Now, examine the goodness motivation for voting. The first implication explored is the role of substitution. One can signal goodness by political positions or by a wide assortment of other behavior such as private charity. One can substitute the latter for the former. Substitution dominates over complementarity, and when the latter operates one can usually specify the reason. If the price of the substitute activity goes down, one expects less political charity.

One way to signal goodness is by being a responsible family person. The price of this behavior is lower among members of groups that strongly disapprove of sexual profligacy. One must subtract from the costs of refraining from adventuring the costs of social disapproval. On this account we predict that Fundamentalists will substitute family values for political charity. There is, however, one kind of political charity complementary with sexual probity: advocacy of pro-family-value political positions.

Fundamentalists also find another display of goodness cheaper than do Mainline Protestants: piety. The former have a deeper belief in after-life consequences of present behavior. In particular, attending church would be a cheaper signal for goodness on the part of a Fundamentalist. They, therefore, have less need to display their goodness by political signals.

We try to separate those two incentives by creating a special measure of the pro-family orientation of the narrowly defined religious denomination of a respondent: the sample percentage of those in the denomination who are either married or widowed and have never been divorced.[11] We call this measure Fmarried. We also use a dummy variable for Mainline Protestants called "Main," classifying the NORC narrow denominations using the guide-lines developed by Green et al. [1993].[12] Similarly, we would expect those who have no religion ("NOREL") to engage in more political charity than others.

In addition, we include a measure of a person's own pro-family behavior: whether the respondent is married or widowed and has never been divorced. That variable is called Married. We also include a variable called Attend: the frequency of church attendance.[13] We cannot sign the affect of these two variables on charity a priori. To the extent that one of these variables acts

as a substitute to political charity one expects a negative relationship between it and political charity. But to the extent that both are manifestations of a desire to be good, variation in the amount of goodness individuals demand would generate a positive relationship.

Table 1 shows that Fmarried has a significant (at the 5% level or lower) impact in the predicted direction on policy preferences in 5 of the 19 cases examined, and does not have any significant impacts in the opposite direction. Being a Mainline Protestant relative to being a Fundamentalist Protestant (Main) leads to a significant effect in the predicted liberal direction in only three cases but there are no significant cases in the opposite direction. Greater values of "NOREL" lead to significant effects in the predicted direction in six cases. There are two significant effects that are opposite from the predicted effect. Those with no religion are more opposed to greater expenditures on social security and on the poor.

Greater values of Married lead a person to be significantly more conservative, significantly more anti-abortion, more anti-crime and against more expenditures on the environment. There is one opposite case. For Blacks, Married leads to greater support for government expenditures on blacks.

There is a significant positive slope for Attend at the means of other relevant variables[14] in eight cases and each leads to the more conservative position. It would appear in both the case of Married and Attend, but especially in the latter case, that substitution dominates over individual variation in the demand for goodness.

While the Catholic and Jewish controls are interesting, they are not important for the main hypotheses here and their discussion is reserved for a footnote.[15]

D. Substitution: Community Involvement

There is also another way to manifest trustworthiness to others: by forming reciprocal relations with others, that is by being an active member of the community. Any variable not associated with an individuals goodness that makes it more difficult to participate in community activities should increase the amount of political charity in terms of our previous analysis.

But, the less people know that one is contributing to charity, the less the incentives to do so. The more relationships one has, the greater the number of people likely to know of one's charitable contributions. As shown in Nelson [1998], that effect dominates charitable monetary contributions. But if fewer people know that one has given to charity than ones political position or activities, the opposite might be the case for political charity. Contributions of volunteer labor are more visible and Nelson [1998] shows they not particularly related to being part of the community.

There is another difference between charity and political charity. The charity signal is favorably received by everybody, while political charity offends those most opposed to the policies advocated. This makes political charity more costly if one is already associating with such opponents. The longer one is involved in the community, the greater the probability that some of one's associates are opponents. The purity of ones associates becomes diluted by other bases for associate formation.

We study several variables that are related to community involvement. Probably the purest such variable is migration. Migration reduces community membership, and the further one moves the less the network of friends and relatives one is likely to have at one's destination.

We use two migration variables: whether one is an intrastate migrant (Statmig) in the sense that one lives in a different town but the same state that one lived in when 16, and Contmig, whether one was an interstate migrant in the same sense. There are three cases where intrastate migrants are significantly more liberal than non-migrants but one case where intra-state migrants are more conservative than non-migrants. Interstate migrants are significantly more liberal in six cases significantly more conservative only in one case.

We also posit that the age variable acts dominantly as a community membership variable: one can establish a reputation through present and past participation in the community.[16] The slope of the age variable at its mean and the mean of other relevant variables is almost always significant. There are thirteen cases where older people are more conservative; three where they are more liberal: They are more Democratic, vote for Democratic candidates for President and are in favor of greater expenditures on mass transportation.[17]

Some of the other variables that we have previously discussed also have a community involvement component. One expects community involvement to be positively related to church activities. Previously, we interpreted the negative relationship between church attendance and political charity and the positive relationship between no church affiliation and political charity to be piety acting as a substitute, but it could be due to community involvement.

That alternative hypothesis would seem to be required to explain a seeming paradox. Church attendance is the single most important variable (Nelson 1998) explaining standard charity for non-church based contributions as well as contributions through the church, and yet it

produces less political charity. The usual altruism explanation for both standard charity and political charity makes no sense in terms of this result.

There is another community-involvement variable: city-size. It is harder to be an active member of the community, the denser its population. The anonymity of the city has long been recognized. City residence will also make a person more liberal because his neighbors will be more liberal and may consist of more blacks, migrants, singles, and faithless.

Suburbs also create unfavorable conditions for community involvement, since a substantial portion of their population commute long distances to work with a resulting separation of the social life of work and residence. Holding density constant, suburbs should have less community involvement than other city types. Suburbanites are also affected by the attitudes of central city residents, since the latter are often the work associates of the former. This too should make suburbanites more liberal.

It is not surprising that city size categories make a significant difference in the predicted direction for most of the issues investigated. In three of the cases: mass transit, roads, and the environment, there are clear differences in self-interest by city-size categories. But the city-size effect is significant for most of the other issues as well. There are thirteen issues where those in the largest central cities (LRCIT) and seven where those in the next largest (SCCIT) are significantly more liberal than those in rural areas, the control group. There are three issues for which no city-size category is significant -- social security, aid to the poor and expenditures for blacks (among blacks). For roads all city size categories are significant except large central cities (a surprising exception). For police expenditures, results are reversed, and significantly so.

The larger the city the more its residents adopt the conservative position -- more expenditures to fight crime. The obvious explanation is that large cities have a more serious crime problem.

For six issues the suburbs of the largest cities (LSURB) are significantly more liberal than the comparable density group -- other urban: the environment, welfare, abortion, education, city expenditures, roads, and mass transit and this is also true for the suburbs of the next largest cities (SSURB). Three of these positions can be explained by self-interested connections to the city: the environment, city expenditures, and mass transit. One is just the reverse of what one would anticipate in terms of self-interest: roads. Commuters are heavy users of roads as well as mass transit. For party identification suburbanites are more conservative than residents in the category other urban.

An alternative explanation for why the lack of family values and community involvement makes a person more liberal is that there will be fewer people to turn to in case of disaster if one is not in close touch with family or other people. So, one will be more interested in government programs as a security blanket (Borcheding and Holsey, 1996). However, none of our results imply that this process dominates. There are four issues where insurance considerations could be important -- health, social security, aid to the poor, and welfare. Married has an insignificant coefficient for all four. Fmarried has a significant coefficient only for aid to the poor. So too for the migration variables, but that significant issue -- social security -- has the wrong sign. Positions on social security are not significantly related to city size, nor are positions about aid to the poor. City size categories have less effect on the health issue than on most other issues. Only welfare positions are strongly city-size related.[18]

There is one community involvement variable that is positively related to political charity: the number of organizations to which one belongs (Memnum). It has a significant liberal coefficient in seven cases and there are no significant conservative coefficients.

The difference between Memnum and the other community involvement variables is that Memnum can be a function of a persons activism rather than simply influencing the activism.[19] One may join the ACLU or the Sierra Club in ones desire to be good. Naturally one may join the John Birch Society but the positive effect of Memnum is important evidence for the asymmetry of political charity: that there is a greater return to being a good liberal compared to being a good conservative.

E. Occupational Choice

We hypothesize that one of the determinants of occupational choice is the desire to display ones goodness. Those occupations that provide a platform for espousing good views or an opportunity to fight injustice will tend to be chosen by those with such views and those convinced about these injustices. We concentrate our attention on college and other teachers, journalists, clergymen, and lawyers. Our technique is to look at the regression coefficients of the dummy variables associated with whether one or one's spouse is a member or not of the respective occupations, controlling for all the other determinants of political preferences. We define college teachers by industry rather than occupation because there is a serious problem with the occupational definition in this case. Many college teachers would not so classify themselves. They might call themselves economists, physicists and so forth. However, use of the occupational definition does not change the essence of our results.

It comes as no surprise that college teachers are liberal. In no other occupation are there so few constraints placed on advocacy. Academic freedom virtually removes employer monitoring of college teaching. College teachers are significantly liberal on nine issues, and there are no issues on which college teachers are significantly more conservative.

Others have found college teachers even more liberal (Trow, 1975). Our regressions do, however, reveal an important consequence of the liberal proclivities of academics. The political position of those who have been to college is affected by what their teachers had to say long after they leave college. There are twelve issues on which people adopt significantly more liberal positions the greater the number of years they have attended college.[20] However, there are four cases in which those who have been to college are significantly more conservative, and that is enough cases to make it unlikely that these latter results are just attributable to chance.

But is not surprising that there are some issues about which years of college make one more conservative. The greater one's education the more likely one associates with others of higher income. Through imitation this should make those who have been to college more conservative even controlling for their own income. We have seen that prediction work by broad occupations. In Nelson [1998], it is shown to work by ethnic groups. We are not able to predict a priori whether the income associates or the college experience effect will dominate. However, two of the liberal positions produced by college do not meet resistance from high-income groups, who are also pro-abortion and neutral as far as increased expenditures on education.

Though our theory does not predict the sign of the year of college slope, it does yield more subtle predictions. Holding constant the general age effect, one expects years of college to

have a greater liberal effect the younger the person. A college student starts out being indoctrinated by teachers and peers. He, then, starts associating with people with higher incomes, and gradually moves toward the political position of that group. To test this hypothesis we create a cross-product variable: age times years of college: (AGECOLYR.) There are six cases where AGECOLYR is significant in the predicted direction and only one case where it is significant in the wrong direction: parks, hardly one of the burning social issues emphasized on campuses in the second half of the twentieth century. There is also one issue for which both income and college teaching have the same sign: abortion. On that basis there is no clear prediction about the sign of AGECOLYR. In the abortion case older ex-college students are significantly more conservative.

There is one more testable implication about the effect of college indoctrination on the political position of those with college experience. One would expect those with college to be most liberal on those issues on which college teachers are most liberal and least liberal about those issues on which those with higher income are least liberal. Indeed, this is the case. Since one expects the slope by issues to be sensitive to the variance by issue, we compare standardized regression coefficients -- betas -- by issue. We then regress the beta for years of college (Colgo) against the log income slope (Insl) and the college teaching slope. The results:

$$\text{COLGO} = .0087 + \underset{(3.58)}{.367\ \text{INSL}} + \underset{(3.18)}{.241\ \text{COTEIN}}$$

With 19 observations, these t values (in parentheses) are significant at the 5% level.[21]

All of the results on college teaching possibly could be explained by an alternative hypothesis: knowledge makes one liberal. When does knowledge end and indoctrination begin? Are classes devoted to information about the benefits of government activity without a concern for costs indoctrinating or transmitting knowledge? Economists -- the one group that focuses on cost-benefit analysis -- are the most conservative group of social scientists (Lipset and Ladd, 1971). This strongly suggests that at least some of the college effect is attributable to indoctrination. In addition, the aged are more conservative. To the extent that this is attributable to the greater knowledge of the aged, this result is inconsistent with the knowledge explanation.

Teaching at lower than the college level (LOWTEACH) also offers a platform for the espousal of political positions, but the platform is much lower because of the constraints placed on these other teachers by lesson plans and more careful monitoring of their activities. They are significantly more liberal on three issues.

Increases in years of below-college education (NCOLYPR) make people significantly more liberal on six issues and it makes them significantly more conservative on four issues. In the absence of an indoctrination effect, increases in years of below-college education would be positively associated with conservative positions because increases in education lead to greater associations with people with higher incomes. The only reason we know why this effect does not dominate is the possible indoctrinating effect of below-college education. [22]

Educational indoctrination together with income imitation should make older less than college educated people more conservative (AGENCOLYR), even controlling for the general

effect of aging on political positions. This prediction is significantly confirmed in six cases, while there are four cases in which the sign of the age-years of non-college education coefficient is significantly in the opposite direction. This is not a ringing confirmation of the below-college indoctrination hypothesis. Of all of our tests the only one that suggests this indoctrination is the more liberal stance on a substantial number of issues of those with more below-college education..

Writing -- and journalism in particular -- is another occupation that could provide a platform for do-gooders. Because of the relatively small sample size of journalists in the NORC study, our study would be expected to yield only limited information on this subject. Writers, including journalists, are significantly more liberal than others on four issues. They are not significantly more conservative on any issues.

Some lawyers might choose that occupation to help right the world's injustices. There are four cases where lawyers are significantly more liberal and no cases where they are more conservative.

Clergy is another occupation where sermonizing goodness is a determinant of occupational choice. But in this case the possible range of sermons is large. A clergyman can focus on piety and family values as well as social issues. In consequence, it is not clear, a priori, whether clergymen, in general, will be liberal or conservative. Our study yields only one significant coefficient out of nineteen.

F. Sex

A variable that is consistently significant issue after issue is sex. There are 13 issues where males are significantly more conservative than females; two where they are significantly more liberal: crime and parks. It is easy to understand the latter results. Women are more likely to be victims of crime, and less likely to be criminals. Men probably use parks more than do women.

Why are women more liberal than men? Conceivably, the underlying cause is womens lower wages. But families in which adult women are a part probably do not have dramatically lower income than the families including adult males. One would also expect the imitation affect to be much less with a sex variable than with most of the other variables we employ. In general, imitation magnifies any underlying regression if one associates dominantly with people like oneself. Women and men do a lot of associating with one another. Yet, the sex variable has more significant liberal coefficients than does income itself. (13 compared to 11).

The only explanation for this sex difference that we can conjecture is not really part of our central theory. We hypothesize that this difference is attributable at least in part to a biological reason: women are more compassionate than men because compassion is a useful tool for child-rearing. Compassion is a word often used in defense of liberal positions, and it would seem to have particular relevance to the liberal position on crime and defense, as well as all the pro-poor positions.

G. Conclusion

This paper provides evidence for two propositions: (1) That political charity is asymmetric, that do-gooders adopt pro-poor political positions and positions opposed to the preponderance of special interests in the initial state; (2) that political charity has a profound effect on political behavior. We test two hypotheses that are generated by these propositions. (1) Substitution: when the price of alternative ways of showing goodness goes up, people adopt more liberal political positions. We show that increases in the price of personal probity, piety, and community involvement increase liberalism. (2) Occupational choice: liberals choose occupations which provide a platform for their views. College teachers, writers, and lawyers tend to be liberals, but there is not strong evidence that this is also true for non-college teachers.

Of course there are alternative hypotheses for some of our results, but none that we know to explain the whole pattern. That is not surprising, since there has been only one alternative idea developed: simple self-interest. Because of the free-rider problem that idea has serious problems in explaining political behavior.

Table 1 : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	PROWELF		PROPOOR		PROHEAL		PROED		PROENV		PROSOC		PROARMS	
FY	-1.24E-01	***	-8.67E-02	***	-4.33E-02	***	-4.49E-03		-3.01E-02	***	-7.34E-02	***	1.74E-02	**
FY2	3.35E-03		-1.62E-02	***	-1.42E-02	***	-9.98E-03	***	-1.60E-02	***	-2.43E-02	***	5.87E-03	*
FYSLOPE	-1.26E-01	***	-7.57E-02	***	-3.37E-02	***	2.25E-03		-1.93E-02	***	-5.70E-02	***	1.34E-02	*
SELF	-3.70E-02	**	-1.04E-01	***	-5.70E-02	***	-5.22E-02	***	-4.75E-02	***	-7.06E-02	***	-1.57E-02	
PROF	-2.36E-01	***	-1.29E-01	***	-1.13E-01	***	-7.53E-02	***	-1.73E-01	***	-5.87E-02	***	7.85E-02	***
MGM	-4.69E-02	**	-1.96E-02		-1.13E+04		-3.18E-02	***	-5.71E-03		-7.27E-03		1.95E-03	
CLERK	-4.36E-02	***	-5.39E-02	***	-8.45E-03		1.42E-03		-9.09E-03		-2.36E-03		-1.06E-02	
SALES	-5.18E-02	***	-3.88E-02	*	-1.40E-02		-7.44E-03		-3.68E-03		-2.12E-02		1.76E-02	
SERVE	2.23E-02		-3.81E-04		-1.96E-03		-8.82E-03		4.37E-03		1.93E-02		2.31E-02	*
AGR	-2.44E-02		-3.49E-02		-8.97E-03		-3.50E-02		-6.59E-02	***	-4.61E-02		-8.59E-02	***
BLACK	4.76E-01	***	2.89E-01	***	1.49E-01	***	1.57E-01	***	6.54E-02	***	1.05E-01	***	-1.85E-01	***
UNION	-1.35E-03		-6.60E-03		1.32E-02	*	1.59E-02	**	8.07E-03		2.93E-02	***	-6.17E-03	
GOVR	8.15E-02	***	0.00E+00		3.27E-02	**	-4.34E-03		3.33E-02	**	0.00E+00		-1.22E-02	
MAIN	-1.19E-02		2.19E-02		1.55E-02		-5.15E-03		2.22E-02		-1.63E-02		-1.26E-02	
JEW	2.16E-01	***	8.42E-04		6.41E-02		1.81E-01	***	8.20E-02		5.45E-02		-1.58E-01	**
JSLOPE	1.33E-01	*	6.96E-03		9.60E-02	*	1.47E-01	***	9.71E-02	*	2.21E-02		-7.90E-02	
CATHOLIC	2.02E-02		1.10E-02		2.13E-02		1.84E-03		2.69E-02		2.57E-02		-2.14E-02	
CSLOPE	4.72E-02		-2.28E-02		1.57E-02		1.05E-02		5.32E-02	*	2.53E-02		-7.99E-02	**
NOREL	1.52E-02		-1.21E-01	***	-2.13E-02		-5.36E-04		1.56E-02		-7.80E-02	***	-1.05E-01	***
OTHREL	1.19E-02		-5.33E-02		9.29E-03		6.51E-02	*	4.07E-02		-4.19E-02		-1.06E-01	**
ATTEND	-1.12E-02		1.88E-02		-1.27E-02		-8.50E-03		-2.72E-02	***	-5.37E-03		1.67E-02	*
ATTENDSL	-1.03E-02	***	-2.11E-04		-1.13E-02	***	-5.55E-03	***	-8.02E-03	***	-9.66E-03	***	4.85E-03	**
PATT	5.47E-03		-2.65E-02	**	-4.31E-03		1.08E-04		8.06E-03		-2.50E-03		-1.18E-02	
CATT	6.76E-03		-8.49E-03		-1.42E-03		2.18E-03		6.61E-03		-9.70E-05		-1.47E-02	*
JATT	-2.08E-02		1.54E-03		8.01E-03		-8.39E-03		3.80E-03		-8.12E-03		1.99E-02	
FUNDAT	-1.99E-03		-1.15E-04		2.25E-03		1.29E-03		6.40E-03	***	-1.31E-03		-5.88E-04	
FYINCOME	9.59E-02		1.15E-02		-3.77E-02		-8.13E-03		-3.95E-02		-8.73E-02	*	-2.02E-01	***
FMARRIED	-1.54E-01		-4.99E-01	***	-1.39E-01	*	-1.02E-01		-1.99E-01	**	-1.02E-01		3.70E-01	***
MARRIED	-3.30E-03		-2.16E-02		1.13E-02		5.43E-03		-3.52E-02	***	-1.65E-02		3.12E-03	
CHILD	-2.07E-02		8.39E-02	***	6.05E-03		3.23E-02	**	4.54E-03		4.17E-02	**	2.39E-02	
NCHILD	3.14E-02	***	-2.44E-02	**	-5.90E-03		-8.41E-03	*	-1.03E-02	**	-1.52E-02	**	-3.78E-03	
STATMIG	-2.10E-03		1.99E-02		3.85E-03		1.86E-02	**	9.91E-03		-9.82E-03		-2.27E-02	**
CONTMIG	1.13E-02		3.32E-02	*	1.31E-02		2.21E-02	**	3.42E-02	***	-3.26E-02	***	-1.25E-02	

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	ANTICRIME	PROROAD	PROMASS	PROPARK	PROCITY(0)	PROCITY(1)	PRORACE(0)
FY	1.60E-02 **	6.81E-03	2.96E-03	-3.38E-02 ***	-1.25E-02	-2.58E-02	-2.86E-02 ***
FY2	-2.26E-03	-2.27E-03	3.65E-03	-9.06E-03 ***	-2.64E-03	-8.92E-03	-6.65E-04
FYSLOPE	1.76E-02 ***	8.34E-03	4.91E-04	-2.77E-02 ***	-1.07E-02	-1.97E-02	-2.82E-02 ***
SELF	-3.29E-02 ***	-5.48E-02 ***	-2.10E-02	-2.77E-02 **	-4.46E-02 ***	-2.80E-02	-3.12E-02 **
PROF	-3.26E-02	3.14E-03	-1.16E-02	-2.00E-02	-9.57E-03	-1.25E-02	-5.92E-02 ***
MGM	-2.60E-02 **	4.27E-03	-4.45E-03	-2.10E-02	-5.74E-02 ***	-1.34E-02	-4.89E-02 ***
CLERK	1.88E-02 **	4.15E-03	9.51E-03	-9.75E-03	-7.60E-03	-3.97E-03	-1.66E-02
SALES	1.34E-02	3.19E-02 **	2.87E-03	2.99E-03	-1.92E-02	-1.37E-02	-9.86E-03
SERVE	3.36E-03	3.12E-02 **	6.64E-03	4.17E-03	1.95E-02	1.26E-02	3.49E-02 ***
AGR	-5.34E-02 **	8.77E-03	-3.05E-02	-5.92E-02 **	-9.68E-02 ***	-1.26E-01	2.00E-02
BLACK	4.22E-02 ***	-4.71E-02 **	6.41E-02 ***	1.32E-01 ***	2.58E-01 ***	2.06E-01 ***	0.00E+00
UNION	3.08E-02 ***	3.61E-02 ***	1.32E-02	2.15E-02 **	4.26E-03	-2.18E-03	-2.71E-02 ***
GOVR	-3.73E-02 ***	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	0.00E+00	2.96E-02 **	2.35E-02	-3.78E-02 ***
MAIN	7.72E-03	-3.48E-03	3.48E-03	1.97E-03	1.96E-02	2.99E-02	8.42E-03
JEW	4.53E-02	-1.10E-01	6.32E-03	6.76E-02	1.96E-01 **	1.98E-01 *	2.10E-01 ***
JSLOPE	-2.26E-02	-6.73E-02	-4.46E-02	4.89E-02	2.53E-01 ***	2.08E-01 *	1.91E-01 ***
CATHOLIC	2.01E-02	-5.25E-03	-3.38E-02	-1.65E-02	2.99E-02	3.77E-02	-3.65E-03
CSLOPE	-1.00E-02	-1.13E-03	-2.45E-02	5.23E-03	2.23E-02	1.26E-02	4.06E-02
NOREL	-9.23E-02 ***	-1.76E-03	2.68E-02	5.10E-02 *	1.65E-02	6.14E-02	9.54E-02 ***
OTHREL	-8.21E-02 **	-5.25E-03	3.31E-03	6.53E-02	8.80E-02	6.24E-02	4.34E-02
ATTEND	6.32E-03	-2.27E-03	7.35E-04	-4.06E-03	-1.02E-04	1.10E-02	-1.20E-02
ATTENDSL	-1.59E-03	-3.27E-03	9.33E-05	-5.94E-03 ***	2.46E-03	-2.24E-05	7.37E-03 ***
PATT	-7.37E-03	2.77E-03	-4.86E-03	-2.48E-05	-4.22E-04	-1.00E-02	8.00E-03
CATT	-7.56E-03	1.04E-03	2.32E-03	5.46E-03	-1.90E-03	-6.32E-03	1.11E-02
JATT	-1.71E-02	1.07E-02	-1.28E-02	-4.69E-03	1.42E-02	2.60E-03	-4.71E-03
FUNDAT	-5.39E-04	-1.66E-03	1.09E-03	-1.61E-03	1.56E-03	-1.61E-03	6.00E-03 ***
FYINCOME	-6.06E-02	4.36E-02	1.13E-01 **	-1.54E-02	-9.14E-04	-4.68E-02	4.07E-02
FMARRIED	6.59E-02	1.02E-01	-3.10E-02	-2.00E-02	-9.77E-02	-7.17E-02	8.37E-02
MARRIED	1.65E-02 **	9.80E-03	-1.36E-02	-2.35E-03	-1.79E-02	-1.05E-02	2.25E-03
CHILD	1.16E-02	2.24E-02	-2.29E-02	-4.42E-03	1.48E-02	1.85E-02 ***	-3.07E-02 ***
NCHILD	-6.52E-03	-2.16E-02 ***	9.61E-04	1.78E-02 **	-1.18E-02 *	3.91E-03	1.18E-06
STATMIG	-9.60E-04	-7.69E-03	3.71E-02 ***	-1.76E-03	2.70E-03	-1.03E-02	-6.83E-03
CONTMIG	-1.93E-02 **	-8.87E-03	6.32E-02 ***	1.58E-02	3.65E-02 ***	2.53E-02	1.28E-02

* Significance at 10% level ** Significance at 5% level *** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	PRORACE(1)		ANTIABORT		PROREPUBL		PROCONSERV		PRESR	
FY	-3.02E-02	*	-3.85E-01	***	2.11E-01	***	1.06E-01	***	5.62E-02	***
FY2	-7.72E-03		-3.53E-02		7.73E-02	***	2.89E-02	***	1.66E-02	***
FYSLOPE	-2.50E-02	*	-3.62E-01	***	1.59E-01	***	8.66E-02	***	4.50E-02	***
SELF	-8.06E-02	**	-1.24E-01		1.92E-01	***	2.42E-02		3.04E-02	***
PROF	-6.63E-02		-5.13E-01	***	-1.57E-02		3.96E-02		-8.27E-02	***
MGM	-3.30E-02		-4.67E-02		2.22E-01	***	4.19E-02		4.52E-02	***
CLERK	1.05E-02		-2.33E-01	***	1.46E-01	***	4.48E-02	**	4.14E-02	***
SALES	1.41E-02		-1.77E-01	*	2.38E-01	***	8.50E-02	***	3.92E-02	***
SERVE	-1.55E-02		1.69E-01	*	6.34E-03		-4.83E-02	**	1.24E-02	
AGR	3.08E-02		-2.05E-01		2.07E-01	***	-1.53E-02		6.45E-03	
BLACK	0.00E+00		-7.07E-02		-1.29E+00	***	-3.33E-01	***	-4.12E-01	***
UNION	4.97E-02	***	-1.61E-01	**	-2.33E-01	***	-7.40E-02	***	-4.43E-02	***
GOVR	-1.80E-02		9.02E-03		-1.59E-01	***	-8.13E-02	***	-3.96E-02	***
MAIN	-7.26E-02		-3.17E-01	***	-8.05E-02	**	-2.29E-03		-2.67E-02	**
JEW	-4.84E-01	*	-3.06E-01		-1.27E+00	***	-6.02E-01	***	-2.93E-01	***
JSLOPE	-1.68E-01		-1.06E+00	**	-1.37E+00	***	-5.01E-01	***	-3.17E-01	***
CATHOLIC	1.23E-02		-2.72E-01		-3.15E-01	***	-5.43E-02		-6.29E-02	***
CSLOPE	2.38E-02		3.50E-01		-3.84E-01	***	-1.02E-01		-1.17E-01	***
NOREL	-2.71E-02		-5.79E-01	***	-8.51E-02		-3.28E-01	***	-1.36E-01	***
OTHREL	5.08E-02		-2.91E-01		-1.47E-01		-1.43E-01	*	-1.57E-01	***
ATTEND	-8.97E-03		3.20E-01	***	4.51E-04		8.18E-02	***	1.73E-02	***
ATTENDSL	-4.13E-03		5.16E-01	***	4.14E-02	***	4.50E-02	***	1.12E-02	***
PATT	8.37E-03		-1.29E-01	**	5.91E-02	***	-2.06E-03		-3.90E-03	
CATT	2.88E-03		1.56E-01	***	-1.74E-02		-1.20E-02		-1.36E-02	**
JATT	7.93E-02	*	-1.90E-01		-2.54E-02		2.53E-02		-6.01E-03	
FUNDAT	-1.41E-03		-1.33E-01	***	4.36E-03		-1.70E-02	***	-5.90E-05	
FYINCOME	5.79E-02		-1.42E+00	***	2.98E-01	**	-1.07E-01		3.03E-02	
FMARRIED	1.10E-01		3.74E-01		1.23E+00	***	3.95E-01	**	8.58E-02	
MARRIED	4.02E-02	**	5.29E-01	***	1.37E-02		1.04E-01	***	1.09E-03	
CHILD	-1.38E-02		-2.36E-01	**	-9.90E-03		-1.40E-02		-4.22E-03	
NCHILD	-1.22E-03		3.05E-01	***	1.56E-02		3.10E-02	***	2.65E-03	
STATMIG	-4.69E-02	*	2.28E-02		7.16E-02	**	2.43E-02		8.32E-03	
CONTMIG	-1.76E-02		-7.38E-03		1.02E-01	***	-1.36E-02		8.04E-03	

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	PROWELF		PROPOOR		PROHEAL		PROED		PROENV		PROSOC		PROARMS	
MIGSL	5.40E-03		2.73E-02	*	9.03E-03		2.06E-02	***	2.35E-02	***	-2.26E-02	**	-1.70E-02	*
CLERGYSL	1.24E-01		-4.37E-02		3.29E-02		1.93E-02		-1.53E-02		-1.37E-02		3.88E-02	
AGE	-1.79E-02	***	-3.55E-03		1.56E-02	***	5.63E-03	**	-6.71E-03	***	1.90E-02	***	6.29E-03	**
AGE2	9.35E-05	***	-4.76E-05	*	-1.30E-04	***	-7.68E-05	***	3.87E-05	***	-1.71E-04	***	-9.47E-05	***
AGESL	-2.41E-03	***	-3.30E-03	***	-1.10E-03	***	-5.32E-03	***	-8.21E-03	***	-6.34E-04		4.41E-03	***
MEMNUM	-3.36E-04		1.19E-04		1.02E-02	***	1.27E-02	***	1.02E-02	***	4.00E-03		-5.30E-04	
LCCIT	1.41E-01	***	3.28E-02		4.49E-02	**	7.24E-02	***	9.88E-02	***	5.04E-02	*	-5.25E-02	**
SCCIT	4.98E-02	**	-1.94E-02		-9.57E-03		1.48E-02		2.90E-02	*	1.72E-02		-1.12E-02	
SSURB	5.21E-02	**	-1.50E-02		-2.58E-03		2.86E-02	**	4.82E-02	***	2.54E-02		3.16E-03	
LSURB	8.85E-02	***	-1.26E-02		5.14E-03		3.60E-02	**	4.41E-02	***	3.05E-02		4.36E-03	
OURB	3.00E-02	*	-1.84E-02		-1.09E-02		-5.12E-03		9.58E-03		1.79E-02		7.86E-03	
SCITY	2.01E-02		8.01E-03		3.76E-02	***	3.89E-02	***	4.53E-02	***	-4.67E-03		1.19E-02	
MCITY	-4.16E-03		5.30E-02	**	4.49E-02	***	6.52E-02	***	7.47E-02	***	1.44E-02		3.17E-06	
SUBRB	2.33E-02		4.17E-02		1.97E-02		4.27E-02	***	7.08E-02	***	-3.10E-02	*	-4.11E-02	**
LCITY	6.50E-02	***	2.94E-02		5.78E-02	***	5.89E-02	***	8.03E-02	***	3.70E-02	**	-1.19E-02	
LOWTEACH	-4.25E-03		1.67E-02		3.66E-02	**	5.95E-02	***	6.94E-03		8.85E-03		-2.39E-02	
COLTEACH	1.04E-01	***	8.27E-02	*	9.40E-03		-1.14E-02		9.60E-02	***	-4.57E-02		-1.12E-01	***
WRITER	1.71E-01	**	1.34E-01		7.48E-02		-6.89E-02		1.01E-01	**	-3.91E-02		-2.13E-01	***
LAWYER	2.08E-01	**	5.19E-02		2.07E-02		5.02E-02		5.05E-01		-7.35E-02		-1.46E-01	**
CLERGY	1.22E-01		-4.39E-02		3.09E-02		1.46E-02		-3.08E-02		-2.23E-03		4.24E-02	
CLERGYFU	1.11E-02		1.44E-03		1.67E-02		3.92E-02		1.29E-01	**	-9.53E-02		-3.03E-02	
PRIEST	1.71E-02		5.82E-02		7.49E-02	*	1.06E-02		1.13E-01	**	1.45E-02		-1.21E-01	**
BLACCL	1.27E-01	*	-5.23E-03		4.92E-02		5.10E-02		1.63E-02		4.14E-02		-1.24E-02	
ARMY	-3.68E-02		-1.52E-02		-7.68E-03		-8.69E-03		3.21E-02		9.42E-03		2.11E-01	***
GOVENP	4.62E-02		6.81E-03		3.38E-02		-1.03E-02		-9.33E-03		-1.82E-02		-1.72E-01	***
NCOLYPR	-5.82E-02	***	-3.02E-02	*	3.33E-02	***	2.28E-02	***	3.86E-02	***	1.06E-02		-3.75E-02	***
COLYR	1.04E-02		-2.38E-02	**	-8.94E-03		3.16E-02	***	4.68E-03		-3.69E-02	***	-6.61E-02	***
AGENCOLYR	6.23E-04	***	3.89E-04		-4.40E-04	***	-3.07E-04	**	-4.60E-04	***	-3.95E-04	**	5.10E-04	***
AGECOLYR	1.97E-04		1.29E-04		-1.78E-04		-5.39E-04	***	1.18E-04		-4.16E-05		6.52E-04	***
NCYRSLOPE	-4.52E-02	***	-1.30E-02	*	1.38E-02	***	9.11E-03	***	1.82E-02	***	-7.00E-03		-2.67E-02	***
COLYRSLOPE	1.45E-02	***	-1.81E-02	***	-1.68E-02	***	7.68E-03	***	9.92E-03	***	-3.87E-02	***	-5.24E-02	***
MALE	-1.95E-02	*	-4.59E-02	***	-5.63E-02	***	-6.48E-02	***	-4.00E-02	***	-9.40E-02	***	4.20E-02	***
YEAR	-2.76E-03	***	-1.57E-02	***	2.39E-03	***	1.38E-02	***	3.53E-03	***	-5.70E-03	***	-4.48E-03	***

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	ANTICRIME		PROROAD		PROMASS		PROPARK		PROCITY(0)		PROCITY(1)		PRORACE(0)	
MIGSL	-1.12E-02		-8.35E-03		5.18E-02	***	8.07E-03		2.16E-02	**	9.65E-03		4.17E-03	
CLERGYSL	4.81E-02		-1.36E-03		-1.26E-02		-5.38E-02		-3.24E-02		1.40E-02		7.75E-02	
AGE	1.91E-03		2.59E-03		-1.64E-03		-1.30E-02	***	-1.23E-02	***	-3.53E-04		-1.42E-02	***
AGE2	-1.21E-05		-4.96E-05	***	-2.09E-05		3.27E-05	**	6.48E-05	***	-1.73E-05		1.09E-04	***
AGESL	-9.38E-05		2.99E-03	***	1.05E-03	***	-4.71E-03	***	-3.72E-03	***	-1.55E-03	**	-4.73E-03	***
MEMNUM	1.54E-03		-6.24E-04		7.64E-03	**	1.24E-02	***	-1.58E-03		7.82E-03		7.39E-05	
LCCIT	5.84E-02	***	-4.22E-02		1.01E-01	***	6.67E-02	***	0.00E+00		1.17E-01	***	8.32E-02	***
SCCIT	3.33E-02	**	-8.08E-02	***	4.38E-02	**	9.11E-03		0.00E+00		0.00E+00		1.68E-03	
LSURB	1.98E-02		-7.45E-02	***	3.87E-02	*	-1.47E-02		7.65E-02	***	0.00E+00		7.06E-03	
SSURB	2.41E-02		-6.48E-02	***	6.22E-02	***	2.62E-03		1.20E-01	***	0.00E+00		-7.13E-03	
OURB	-1.73E-04		-5.34E-02	***	1.60E-02		-5.10E-03		4.98E-02	***	0.00E+00		2.74E-02	**
SCITY	3.19E-02	***	-1.02E-02		3.37E-02	**	3.73E-02	***	3.08E-02	**	-3.03E-02		5.32E-02	***
MCITY	4.10E-02	***	-4.41E-02	***	3.42E-02	**	6.35E-02	***	4.63E-02	***	-3.87E-02		3.19E-02	**
SUBRB	9.68E-03		-4.55E-02	**	2.61E-02		3.29E-02	*	8.15E-02	***	-2.52E-02		4.10E-02	**
LCITY	4.76E-02	***	-2.77E-02		6.29E-02	***	7.30E-02	***	1.00E-01	***	1.14E-02		4.41E-02	***
LOWTEACH	5.50E-03		-4.06E-02	*	-3.43E-02		1.73E-02		5.89E-02	**	6.22E-02		7.05E-04	
COLTEACH	-7.49E-02	***	1.36E-02		-6.22E-03		2.51E-02		8.77E-02	***	4.78E-02		9.88E-02	***
WRITER	-2.83E-02		2.73E-02		2.97E-02		-3.90E-02		-3.19E-02		1.06E-01		1.09E-01	**
LAWYER	-5.51E-02		3.34E-02		1.15E-01	**	3.41E-03		4.77E-02		9.34E-02		7.06E-02	
CLERGY	4.62E-02		3.94E-03		1.82E-03		-6.09E-02		-8.48E-03		-5.25E-03		7.38E-02	
CLERGYFU	1.59E-02		-4.42E-02		-1.20E-01	*	5.97E-02		-1.99E-01	**	1.60E-01		3.06E-02	
PRIEST	-2.67E-02		6.60E-02		1.30E-01	**	-1.91E-02		5.04E-02		5.40E-02		5.38E-02	
BLACCL	3.99E-02		-9.01E-02	**	1.61E-02		4.46E-02		-1.20E-02		-4.66E-03		1.06E-01	
ARMY	4.84E-02	*	-3.93E-02		2.93E-03		-3.43E-02		-1.68E-02		-8.85E-02		-1.50E-01	***
GOVENP	-4.49E-02		4.48E-02		2.10E-02		6.62E-02	*	-8.94E-03		1.00E-01		1.42E-01	***
NCOLYPR	1.75E-02	**	-1.33E-02		-1.93E-02		-2.41E-02	**	-7.18E-03		2.89E-03		1.80E-03	
COLYR	-1.51E-02	**	-1.17E-02		3.36E-02	***	-1.90E-02	***	-6.84E-03		4.57E-02	***	3.34E-02	***
AGENCOLYR	-8.91E-05		4.01E-04	*	4.29E-04	**	4.40E-04	**	2.21E-04		1.12E-04		-6.35E-06	
AGECOLYR	4.33E-05		2.66E-04		-1.58E-04		3.69E-04	**	3.10E-04	*	-6.75E-04	**	-1.16E-04	
NCYRSLOPE	1.35E-02	***	4.53E-03		-2.24E-04		-4.55E-03		2.63E-03		7.88E-03		1.52E-03	
COLYRSLOPE	-1.32E-02	***	1.01E-04		2.66E-02	***	-2.61E-03		6.95E-03	**	1.57E-02	***	2.83E-02	***
MALE	-5.44E-02	***	9.68E-02	***	8.63E-03		3.47E-02	***	-7.16E-02	***	-3.15E-02		-6.03E-02	***
YEAR	-1.44E-04		-3.91E-03	***	4.20E-03	***	-6.32E-05		-8.04E-03	***	-9.50E-03	***	-1.25E-03	*

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	PRORACE(1)		ANTIABORT		PROREPUBL		PROCONSERV		PRESR	
MIGSL	-3.05E-02	*	5.90E-03		8.86E-02	***	3.13E-03		8.16E-03	
CLERGYSL	-1.67E-01		1.92E+00	***	2.02E-03		-2.18E-01	*	4.73E-03	
AGE	3.12E-03		-3.63E-02	*	-8.29E-02	***	1.90E-02	***	-7.16E-03	***
AGE2	-2.93E-05		1.07E-04		5.60E-04	***	-5.91E-05	*	5.93E-05	***
AGESL	-3.79E-04		8.31E-06		-1.02E-02	***	7.15E-03	***	-1.40E-03	***
MEMNUM	9.42E-03		-8.80E-02	***	-2.01E-02	**	-9.81E-03	*	-1.97E-03	
LCCIT	2.50E-02		-6.87E-01	***	-3.00E-01	***	-2.21E-01	***	-7.26E-02	***
SCCIT	7.42E-03		-4.75E-01	***	-1.68E-01	***	-1.05E-01	***	-5.74E-02	***
LSURB	5.27E-02		-3.60E-01	***	-1.88E-02		-6.66E-03		-9.42E-03	
SSURB	7.97E-02	*	-4.28E-01	***	4.57E-02		-1.11E-02		-1.72E-04	
OURB	-2.19E-02		-1.01E-01		-9.45E-02	***	-3.63E-02		-3.03E-02	***
SCITY	5.79E-02	**	-1.37E-01		-4.87E-02		-5.13E-03		-1.19E-03	
MCITY	5.00E-02	*	-4.54E-01	***	-3.81E-02		-4.24E-02		2.73E-03	
SUBRB	-6.82E-03		-4.95E-01	***	5.69E-02		-5.98E-02	*	3.65E-03	
LCITY	4.38E-02		-5.71E-01	***	6.39E-03		5.04E-04		5.27E-03	
LOWTEACH	4.20E-02		2.36E-01		-4.02E-02		-8.28E-03		-4.75E-04	
COLTEACH	3.59E-02		-1.87E-01		-3.00E-01	***	-1.48E-01	***	-6.39E-02	***
WRITER	-4.00E-01		-6.28E-01		-5.59E-02		-1.38E-01		-2.61E-02	
LAWYER	-2.24E-02		-6.56E-01		-2.17E-01		-1.09E-01		-1.06E-01	**
CLERGY	-1.40E-01		1.85E+00	***	-1.50E-02		-2.32E-01	***	6.08E-03	
CLERGYFU	-2.23E-01		5.47E-01		1.42E-01		1.20E-01		-1.13E-02	
PRIEST	-1.10E-01		3.68E-01		-1.08E-01		-9.20E-02		-1.16E-03	
BLACCL	5.70E-02		-1.21E+00	***	-4.70E-01	***	-1.62E-01	*	-3.63E-02	
ARMY	-7.22E-02		-3.60E-01		9.76E-02		6.70E-02		4.62E-02	**
GOVENP	5.13E-02		2.37E-02		-2.14E-01	**	-1.03E-01	*	-7.63E-02	***
NCOLYPR	1.37E-02		-3.36E-01	***	-8.94E-02	***	6.27E-02	***	7.01E-03	
COLYR	-1.67E-03		-3.27E-01	***	-4.26E-02	**	-7.39E-02	***	-2.79E-02	***
AGENCOLYR	-9.12E-05		1.98E-03	*	1.83E-03	***	-7.13E-04	**	-1.58E-05	
AGECOLYR	8.89E-05		3.62E-03	***	1.97E-03	***	9.63E-04	***	4.94E-04	***
NCYRSLOPE	9.62E-03	*	-2.48E-01	***	-8.14E-03		3.10E-02	***	6.31E-03	**
COLYRSLOPE	2.28E-03		-1.66E-01	***	4.48E-02	***	-3.11E-02	***	-6.02E-03	***
MALE	-3.06E-02	*	3.35E-01	***	1.59E-01	***	1.05E-01	***	4.56E-02	***
YEAR	-3.89E-03	***	2.52E-02	***	2.29E-02	***	1.06E-02	***	-6.85E-04	

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	PROWELF		PROPOOR		PROHEAL		PROED		PROENV		PROSOC		PROARMS	
NE	8.83E-02	*	1.64E-01	***	5.45E-02		4.79E-02		1.12E-01	***	4.30E-02		-8.38E-02	**
MA	-2.38E-02		3.09E-02		3.66E-02		3.34E-02		1.04E-01	***	3.05E-02		-3.06E-02	
ENC	-9.59E-03		4.57E-02		-1.30E-02		9.63E-03		5.74E-02	***	3.08E-02		-5.70E-04	
WNC	6.53E-02	*	-7.97E-02	*	-1.23E-02		3.95E-02		7.66E-02	***	-5.31E-02	*	2.72E-03	
SA	-5.28E-02	*	-3.61E-02		-1.43E-02		6.11E-02	***	5.01E-02	**	3.98E-03		7.41E-02	***
ESC	5.03E-02		-8.92E-03		-1.57E-02		3.71E-02		8.21E-03		5.51E-02		1.29E-01	***
WSC	2.55E-02		-8.20E-02	*	-4.47E-02	*	1.76E-02		4.43E-02	*	4.11E-03		1.29E-01	***
MT	2.28E-02		5.48E-02		-5.57E-03		3.39E-02		-1.39E-02		9.35E-03		7.44E-03	
16NE	-4.74E-02		-3.32E-02		1.22E-02		-3.67E-02		2.54E-02		-3.67E-02		2.55E-02	
16MA	-4.67E-02		5.63E-03		-1.19E-03		-6.89E-02	***	1.85E-03		-1.26E-02		8.37E-03	
16ENC	5.97E-03		-7.63E-02	*	-1.33E-02		-2.71E-02		-1.16E-02		-4.46E-02		-3.53E-02	
16WNC	4.16E-04		5.50E-02		-2.71E-02		-3.06E-02		-1.90E-02		-2.33E-02		-8.17E-02	***
16SA	2.95E-02		4.09E-02		2.30E-02		-8.85E-03		8.55E-03		6.34E-03		4.37E-03	
16ESC	1.94E-02		-6.00E-02		1.75E-02		3.26E-02		9.27E-03		-1.96E-02		-1.52E-02	
16WSC	-2.89E-02		-4.54E-02		-2.12E-02		-3.32E-03		-2.48E-02		-1.99E-02		-2.32E-03	
16MT	-1.85E-02		-7.49E-02		-4.17E-02		-2.04E-02		-6.76E-02	**	-3.39E-02		6.93E-03	
SIGETHNIC	3.00E+00		2.00E+00		5.00E+00		4.00E+00		7.00E+00		7.00E+00		4.00E+00	
N	18232		7993		26798		26235		25584		15482		26327	
R SQUARE	1.19E-01		8.65E-02		3.79E-02		9.52E-02		9.53E-02		9.01E-02		7.07E-02	
MEAN	1.69		2.53		2.57		2.56		2.51		2.46		1.87	
VARIANCE	4.26E+01		2.58E+01		2.33E+01		2.28E+01		2.42E+01		2.39E+01		3.68E+01	

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	ANTICRIME	PROROAD	PROMASS	PROPARK	PROCITY(0)	PROCITY(1)	PRORACE(0)
NE	2.24E-02	4.58E-02	-8.12E-02 **	-3.42E-02	1.99E-01 ***	-3.66E-03	9.14E-02 **
MA	2.10E-02	1.17E-01 ***	-9.07E-02 ***	-1.25E-02	4.37E-02	1.95E-01 ***	-2.73E-02
ENC	3.24E-02	5.74E-02 **	-9.10E-02 ***	-4.31E-02 *	8.45E-02 ***	4.52E-02	-2.87E-02
WNC	1.96E-02	1.54E-02	-1.04E-01 ***	-1.18E-01 ***	8.11E-02 **	1.90E-01 ***	1.16E-03
SA	4.63E-02 **	-3.42E-02	-1.16E-01 ***	-4.09E-02	-2.78E-02	1.72E-03	-1.16E-01 ***
ESC	4.99E-02 *	2.60E-02	-1.47E-01 ***	-4.94E-02	-8.84E-03	-4.90E-02	-1.65E-01 ***
WSC	2.47E-02	-3.04E-02	-1.25E-01 ***	-7.26E-02 **	-1.16E-02	-1.63E-03	-1.37E-01 ***
MT	-5.78E-03	2.26E-02	-2.32E-02	-8.81E-02 ***	-4.81E-02	-1.49E-02	1.51E-02
16NE	-1.42E-02	3.19E-02	3.55E-02	9.23E-02 **	-7.92E-02 *	3.15E-02	-5.37E-03
16MA	-1.83E-02	1.07E-02	-2.39E-03	5.56E-02 *	-1.10E-02	-3.33E-02	-1.87E-02
16ENC	-3.03E-02	-7.87E-03	-2.60E-02	1.11E-02	-6.04E-02 *	4.47E-02	-1.32E-02
16WNC	-3.94E-02	-2.23E-02	1.60E-03	2.57E-02	-4.95E-02	-4.25E-02	-1.42E-03
16SA	-1.46E-02	8.26E-03	-2.63E-02	4.64E-02 *	-2.00E-02	-1.83E-02	-4.25E-02
16ESC	1.92E-03	8.59E-03	-1.69E-02	3.35E-02	-5.14E-02	-3.92E-03	-3.18E-02
16WSC	-1.25E-03	2.83E-02	-3.47E-02	1.78E-02	-7.40E-02 **	-3.45E-02	-4.31E-02
16MT	-5.24E-02 *	-3.62E-03	4.88E-04	-3.67E-02	-1.69E-02	9.49E-03	-3.95E-02
SIGETHNIC	3.00E+00	5.00E+00	4.00E+00	6.00E+00	5.00E+00	3.00E+00	1.20E+01
N	26839	16280	16175	15508	26315	26895	26659
R SQUARE	1.79E-02	2.99E-02	4.48E-02	5.34E-02	5.06E-02	7.00E-02	5.83E-02
MEAN	2.55	2.31	2.22	2.25	2.19	2.19	2.09
VARIANCE	2.27E+01	2.61E+01	2.69E+01	2.41E+01	3.36E+01	2.96E+01	3.35E+01

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

Table 1(continued) : OLS Regression of Support for Government, Political Parties and Candidate

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE / DEPENDENT VARIABLE	PRORACE(1)		ANTIABORT		PROREPUBL		PROCONSERV		PRESR	
NE	2.06E-01	***	3.64E-01		1.09E-01		-6.79E-03		2.02E-02	
MA	1.05E-01	**	5.54E-01	***	4.96E-02		-2.18E-02		8.40E-03	
ENC	6.94E-02		1.08E+00	***	-3.12E-02		4.88E-02		1.67E-02	
WNC	1.12E-01	*	1.23E+00	***	-8.40E-02		3.63E-02		-1.75E-02	
SA	3.85E-02		4.66E-01	**	4.61E-02		7.04E-02		4.16E-02	**
ESC	3.50E-02		7.78E-01	***	-4.63E-03		1.37E-01	**	3.16E-02	
WSC	7.02E-03		6.62E-01	***	1.91E-02		1.24E-01	**	7.89E-02	***
MT	-2.91E-01	***	5.56E-01	***	-6.61E-02		-8.53E-03		2.37E-02	
16NE	-3.32E-02		-4.09E-01		2.41E-02		-5.16E-02		-1.19E-02	
16MA	4.28E-02		-3.48E-01	*	2.60E-01	***	-2.92E-02		2.51E-02	
16ENC	9.40E-02		-1.43E-01		1.51E-01	**	-5.78E-02		6.88E-03	
16WNC	2.65E-02		-2.36E-01		5.65E-02		-8.17E-02		-1.85E-02	
16SA	3.81E-02		5.58E-02		-1.57E-01	**	-5.63E-02		-2.39E-02	
16ESC	9.80E-02		4.41E-01	*	-1.99E-01	**	-7.20E-02		-2.15E-02	
16WSC	1.14E-01	*	7.94E-02		-2.49E-01	***	-2.63E-02		-1.98E-02	
16MT	2.71E-01	**	5.22E-01	**	2.04E-01	**	9.32E-02	*	4.60E-02	**
SIGETHNIC	7.00E+00		3.00E+00		1.10E+01		4.00E+00		1.10E+01	
N	27810		17210		27407		23636		24327	
R SQUARE	4.93E-02		2.42E-01		1.60E-01		8.74E-02		1.55E-01	
MEAN	2.09		12.43		2.6		4.01		0.55	
VARIANCE	1.64E+01		3.25E+01		7.03E+01		2.94E+01		8.33E+01	

* Significance at 10% level

** Significance at 5% level

*** Significance at 1% level

KEY TO TABLE 1

I. Dependent Variables

1. PROWELF: Are we spending too little (1), about the right amount (2), or too much (3) on welfare?
2. PROPOOR: Are we spending too little (1), about the right amount (2), or too much (3) on assistance to the poor?
3. PROHEAL: On improving and protecting the nation's health?
4. PROED: On improving the nation's educational system?
5. PROENV: On the environment?
6. PROSOC: On Social Security?
7. PROARMS: On the military, armaments, and defense?
8. ANTICRIME: On halting crime?
9. PROROAD: On highways and bridges?
10. PROMASS: On mass transportation?
11. PROPARK: On parks and recreation?
12. PROCITY (0): On solving the problems of big cities? (for those living in cities)
13. PROCITY (1): On solving the problem of big cities? (for those not)
14. PRORACE (0): On improving the conditions of blacks? (for non blacks)
15. PRORACE (1): On improving the conditions of blacks? (for blacks)
16. ANTIABORT: Should it be possible for a pregnant women to obtain a legal abortion under 7 different conditions and dependent variable runs from 7 (all no) to 14 (all yes).
17. PROREPUBL: Identifications with republican party from strong democrat (1) to strong republican (7).
18. PROCONSERV: Political views from extremely liberal (1) through extremely conservative (8).
19. PRESR: Vote for or would have voted for republican presidential candidate.

II. Independent Variables

1. FY = *ln* of family income relative to mean family income estimated by a Pareto distribution.
2. FY2 = the square of the above.
3. FYSLOPE = the coefficient of FY evaluated at the mean levels of variables it interacts with.
4. SELF = self employed.
5. PROF = professional or technical workers.
6. MGM = managers and administrators.
7. CLERK = clerical workers.
8. SALES = sales workers.
9. SERVE = service workers.
10. AGR = farmers and farm laborers, etc.
11. BLACK = Afro-Americans.
12. UNION = union membership by self.
13. GOVEMP = respondent employed by government.
14. MAIN = Protestant and not Baptist, Holiness Pentecostal, or other.
15. JEW = Jewish.
16. JSLOPE = the coefficient of JEW evaluated at the mean levels of the variables it interacts with.
17. CATHOLIC = Catholic.
18. CSLOPE = coefficient of CATHOLIC evaluated at mean level of variables it interacts with.
19. NOREL = no religious preference.
20. OTHREL = religious preference other than Jewish, Protestant or Catholic.
21. ATTEND = from zero (never) through 8 (several times a week) for attendance at religious services.
22. ATTENDSL = Attend slope.
23. PATT = interaction of ATTEND and MAIN.
24. CATT = interaction of ATTEND and CATHOLIC.
25. JATT = interaction of ATTEND and JEWISH.
26. FUNDAT = interaction of ATTEND and ONE minus MAIN.
27. FYINCOME = the average income of the religious denomination to which one belongs.

28. FMARRIED = the percent of one's religious denomination never been married or divorced.
29. MARRIED = married.
30. CHILD = parent of a child at some point in life.
31. NCHILD = number of children parented.
32. STATMIG = located elsewhere in the sate at age 16.
33. CONTMIG = located in a different state at age 16.
34. MIGSL = the coefficient of migratory status evaluated at mean.
35. CLERGYSL = CLERGY Slope.
36. AGE = age.
37. AGE2 = the square of age.
38. AGESL = Age slope.
39. MEMNUM = number memberships in sixteen voluntary organization types.
40. LCCIT = resides in a central city of 12 largest SMSA.
41. SCCIT = resides in a small city of next largest central SMSA.
42. SSURB = resides in a suburb of one of 12 largest SMSA.
43. LSURB = resides in a suburb of one of next 88 largest SMSA.
44. OURB = residence in countries having towns of 10,000 or more.
45. SCITY = resides in suburbs of smaller central city.
46. MCITY = resides in central city of any but the top 100 SMSA's.
47. SUBRB = resides in suburbs of central city of any but the top 100 SMSA's.
48. LCITY = resides in central city of a smaller central city.
49. LOWTEACH = employed as a teacher other than in college or university.
50. COLTEACH = employed as a college or university teacher.
51. WRITER = editors or reporters.
52. LAWYER = lawyers and judges.
53. CLERGY = clergymen.
54. CLERGYFU = clergy interacted with (1-MAIN).
55. PRIEST = clergy interacted with CATHOLIC.
56. BLACCL = clergy interacted with BLACK.
57. ARMY = membership in the armed forces.
58. GOV = employed by government.
59. NCOLYPR = number of years of formal schooling at 12 grade or below.
60. COLYR = number of years of college.
61. AGENCOLYR = interaction of age and number of years of non-college education.
62. AGECOLYR = interaction of age and number of years of college education.
63. NCYRSLOPE = the coefficient of non-college years of education evaluated at the means of the variables it is interacted with.
64. COLYRSLOPE = the coefficient of college years of education at the means of the variables it is interacted with.
65. MALE = male.
66. YEAR = 1972 = 1.

67-74. Resides in one of 8 regions of US: NE, MA, ENC, WNC, SA, ESC, WSC, MT.

75-82. Resided in one of 8 regions at age 16.

83. SIGETHNIC = there are dummy variables for each of 38 ethnic groups specified in Nelson [1994] and this refers to the number of such that were significant at the 5% level or better.

ENDNOTES

1.. There is, of course, some small probability that any non-user will become a user. Non-use value could simply be a use value times the probability of use. However, these probabilities are often so small and the non-use values given so large that this does not seem a satisfactory explanation of non-use value.

2.. The big difference between actual and hypothetical voting is who is likely to know about the behavior, the interviewer or ones friends. For reasons beyond the scope of this article that difference should lead to a higher non-use value for hypothetical voting. Because of the free-rider phenomenon the policy impact of an individuals actual vote will be almost as miniscule as the policy effect of his hypothetical vote. Hence, the importance of what others think in both cases.

3.. Conceivably, the large non-use values are attributable to an inordinate weight placed on the well-being of future generations. But our empirical work in Table 1 we find that those who might be expected to give greater weight to future generations--married people and those with many children--are more opposed to environmental expenditures than others.

4.. The biologists call charity so motivated indirect altruism. (Ridley, 1996), (Alexander, 1987).

5.. At first glance, this seems to violate the proposition that competitive pressure will equalize the benefits of relationships among associates. That proposition could still hold with the rich granting more favors to the poor than vice versa, as long as the poor pay a sufficient price by changing their political position and other groveling activities.

6.. Table 1 suggests, however, that signaling goodness with political positions dominates groveling. For example, a far higher proportion of whites advocate greater expenditures on Afro-Americans than the proportion of the latter advocating less expenditures on Afro-Americans.

7.. This scenario requires more than simple signaling. Both in starting the concern with pollution and, then, starting the concern with over-correction, the knowledgeable must be getting some other return: either a conscience return or some other pay-off to initiating an idea.

8.. NORC asks different respondents whether they are in favor of greater or less expenditures on welfare and on aid to the poor respectively. Since the responses to these two questions were so different we have treated them as separate questions.

9.. For two of the issues the population is divided into two groups.

10.. It is not surprising that blacks want more expenditures to fight crime, though one could not predict this a priori. They have a higher probability of being a victim of crime, but, of course, they have a higher probability of being charged with crime.

11.. For denominations with just a few members in the sample such a measure is subject to considerable sampling error. To reduce this sampling error we restricted our measure to denominations with 30 or more members in the sample.

12.. The NORC classifications were occasionally too broad so a few arbitrary decisions were required.

13.. As scaled by NORC.

14.. There are several cross-product terms in our regressions in which one of the terms is Attend.

15.. Their coefficients and those for other minority religions lend weight to the idea that minority denominations are more liberal.

16.. Conceivably, however, age could also be an information variable.

17.. Some of these results require explanation. How could older people support all of the important positions associated with Republicans (Mass transportation is not that big a political issue) and still end up supporting Democrats? The answer, we believe, lies in a likely interpretation of the social security question in the NORC survey. NORC asks whether expenditures on social security should be increased, decreased or remain the same. We scale the respective answers to this questions as 3, 1, and 2 respectively with dont knows being assigned a 2. Not only are older people more opposed to social security on this scale but the aged are particulary opposed. (Age squared is significantly negative). Nor do these results depend upon the inclusion of all the other variable we employ. The age variable has a significant negative simple correlation with support for social security. On its face these results are inconsistent with political wisdom about the aged and social security. It is not unreasonable for many people to interpret the social security question to mean whether individual benefits to social security should be increased more than they would do so automatically. Given that interpretation, there is a way to explain our results. Most of the social security debate has focused on the fiscal difficulties of maintaining social security benefits including the COLA given an aging population. Even social securitys staunchest advocates in this debate do not advocate an expansion of benefits. Those who are in favor of maintaining the benefits including the COLA would be counted in our survey as 2's. They would be relative opponents of social security, since the mean value of the answers is 2.45. We expect the social security regression to be dominated by determinants of whether people are aware of this debate or not, rather than narrow self-interest or goodness variables. That expectation is confirmed by a closer look at that regression, which we postpone until we discuss all the variables entering into our regressions. Certainly, the aged would

be likely to be among the most informed about this debate.

If the aged support social security, the rest of the puzzle is easily answered. Support for the Democrats among older Americans flows from the Democrats perception as the pro-social security party. The mass transit support of older Americans probably flows from the higher rate of disabilities among that group that limit their driving.

An alternative explanation for older people supporting Democrats is a confusion between the effects of age and cohort effects. Democratic party identification is declining significantly over the years 1972-96. This would tend to generate a positive age effect not controlling for cohorts, which we do not. However, there is no significant decrease over time in Democratic (President) voting percentages over this time period. Furthermore, there is no significant relationship between the betas (the standardized regression coefficients) for Years and the age slope, when one compares issues in such a way that more conservative positions are given positive values. In general, this last result suggests that the age effect over all our issues is not dominantly a disguised cohort effect.

18.. City-size variables also have another feature that would be difficult to explain with the alternative hypothesis. Not only does the current city size in which the respondent lives make a significant difference in political positions, but so too does city size of the respondent when 16. For three of the issues - aid to the poor, health, and parks -- there are more significant coefficients for the latter than the former. For four others the lagged city coefficients are roughly equal those for current cities: the environment, crime, education, city expenditures (for those not in central cities). There are, however, five issues on which the current coefficients are bigger than the lagged ones: welfare, abortion, party identification, Presidential votes, and mass transit.

In Nelson [1994] it was shown that imitation produces lags in voter response to underlying conditions. When a person moves from a city size, it no longer affects the reality he confronts, though it might still affect his family. It is hard to believe that the weight he gives to the family he left behind will be more important than the weight he gives his current family. His attitudes move with him, however, and it is possible that early attitude formation could be more important than what happens later.

19.. For ease of exposition we do not always make the existence of these control variables explicit.

20.. Evaluated at the mean of age, the other component of the one cross-product term involving years of college.

21.. There is, however, a possible problem of simultaneity in using a least-squares regression procedure. Fortunately, the respective simple correlation coefficients are all significant at the 5% level, so whatever the causal process, there does seem to be a relationship by issue between the effect of years of college and the effect of college teaching and the effect of income.

22.. One might question the approach of this section to indoctrination. We have focused on the regression coefficients by issues of college and non-college teachers, holding constant a considerable number of variables. This procedure is appropriate in determining whether do-gooderism explains any part of the political position of these occupations. One would assuredly want to control for the other determinants of political position. However, the issue is somewhat different if one is concerned with the effect of teachers on their students. What difference does it make if a college teacher is made more liberal by his political charity, if, on net, he is conservative because he is in a higher income group? Whether he makes students more liberal or more conservative would seem to depend solely on whether he is liberal or conservative on net relative to the population as a whole. The appropriate measures of that characteristic would be the simple correlation by issue of measures of his political position and job status.

There is, however, a serious problem with this argument. It does make a difference why a college teacher is a liberal. Those who seek to be college teachers in part because it offers a platform for their political views are more likely to use their teaching as a platform. For one thing they are more likely to teach subjects where political views are relevant. Still and all non-activist conservative professors might have some impact in influencing the political position of their students. Both the simple correlations and the regression coefficients would appear relevant in predicting the influence of teachers. Fortunately, the simple correlations yield results similar to the regression coefficients. In terms of the former, college teachers are significantly more liberal on nine issues. There were also nine significantly liberal regression coefficients for college teachers, though the lists are not identical.

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